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In recent issues of Concepts and Methods, core top-
ics have been related to problems of conceptualization. 
In particular, a discussion about the problem of concep-
tualizing accountability in the context of EU policy making 
and a discussion about the meaning of policy learning 
has emerged in our pages. In this issue, both debates go 
on.  
Responding to the contributions by Papadopoulos 
and Bovens in Concepts and Methods 3 (1), 2007, Beate 
Kohler-Koch summarizes results in accountability re-
search and highlights the observation that it depends on 
the perspective on democracy whether civil society or-
ganizations can be considered to foster accountability or 
not. Although the empirical picture of the contribution of 
civil society organizations to EU accountability does not 
reveal a true success story, an appraisal must take into 
account the gradual institutionalization of an 
“accountability regime” in the EU. From this perspective, 
the situation does not present itself as bleak as it might 
look at first sight. 
The other two contributions follow up on the debate 
about policy learning. Nynke Wiekenkamp makes a 
strong point that learning can indeed take place by outlin-
ing the development of early retirement policy in the 
Netherlands. Her methodological advice is that the prob-
lem with identifying policy learning can only be overcome 
by meticulously tracing the detailed shifts in actor con-
stellations, positions, and decisions over time. 
Anne Loeber takes issue with Biegelbauer’s sweep-
ing argument in Concepts and Methods 3 (1), 2007, in 
which he had attempted to clarify the sometimes elusive 
notion of policy learning by restricting its extension. In 
response, Loeber outlines different conceptualizations 
and emphasizes the double problem of identifying the 
agents of learning as well as the changes taking place in 
the learning process. 
 
 
 
 
 
At a more general level, it may be interesting to note 
the importance of conceptualization that is highlighted by 
all three contributions. It may be indicative of a more 
cautious take a empirical analysis that is gradually 
spreading in political science in an attempt to reconcile 
rather elusive phenomena with the ambition to find regu-
larities in politics and to generalize beyond the case at 
hand. 
msw@uni-oldenburg.de.   
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It is widely acknowledged that accountability is a key 
to making democracy work, and luckily a consensus defi-
nition of accountability has emerged: According to Bov-
ens (2007a: 450) “Accountability is a relationship be-
tween an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the 
actor has to face consequences.” Unfortunately, when 
applied to the European Union (EU) we face a reality that 
is far more complex than this straightforward relationship 
suggests. The EU is noted for its policy-making by nego-
tiations in networks that take in a multitude of actors and 
span over different territorial levels of jurisdiction. Yannis 
Papadopoulos (2007) has drawn our attention to the 
many accountability problems of network governance. 
The multi-level feature of EU governance and the com-
position of policy networks work to the detriment of ac-
countability: The lack of visibility of the responsible actors 
impedes accountability, but what makes matters worse is 
that many actors share responsibility and only some of 
them are at least in principle politically accountable while 
in practice they are more often difficult to reach due to a 
long chain of delegation from the level of citizens up.  
Network governance is not unique to the EU or inter-
national relations (Bovens 2007b). It has been spread 
also in the European member states by upgrading the 
executive and by increasing stakeholder participation in 
the attempt to profit from the expert knowledge of private 
actors and to ensure compliance through cooperation 
instead of through hierarchy (Pierre & Peters 2000). Why 
is it that we are less worried about the accountability trap 
of network governance at the national as compared to 
the EU level? The reason is that, despite the lack of visi-
bility and the “problem of many hands” (Bovens 2007a: 
457) obscuring responsibility, government must never-
theless take the blame while party competition and elec-
tions ensure that those in power will have to face conse-
quences. The long chain of delegation is cut short by 
administrators expectation of accountability and those 
administrators are usually well aware that they are work-
ing “in the shadow” of potential politicization: political 
issues are always susceptible to contestation and a spill 
over into a wider public debate. By contrast to politics at 
the national level, politics at the EU-level shy away from 
politicization; the EU is not a majoritarian system respon-
sive to elections and party competition. The EU polity 
functions according to the logic of consociation; it is 
geared towards consensus and derives legitimacy from 
uncontested expert knowledge and direct links to “civil 
society.” It is consistent with the logic of consociational-
ism that, since the turn of the century, the “involvement 
of civil society” has gained high prominence in EU gov-
ernance (Commission 2001). Civil society is seen as a 
remedy for the democratic deficit of the Union, enhancing 
democratic participation and accountability. But how, if at 
all, does civil society remedy to the democratic account-
ability problems of EU governance? 
The two faces of civil society  
When examining the widely alleged virtues of civil 
society for EU democracy, we have to sort out the many 
uses and ambiguities of the term. Opting for a parsimoni-
ous approach we can conceptualise civil society’s rela-
tionship to the EU in two ways. Firstly, there is the con-
cept of the emergent active citizenry of the Union that 
constitutes the crucial democratic forum at which deci-
sion-makers are held to account. Both liberal and delib-
erative theories share the view that democracies need a 
demos with active citizens but deliberative theories bring 
civil society to the fore. It is generating the public sphere, 
evaluating EU governance and passing judgement in 
public discourse. But while communicative power may be 
generated in the public sphere, in this conception civil 
society has no actor quality. By a second more agential 
concept civil society is equated with civil society organi-
sations. Only organised civil society can be the relevant 
other in the above mentioned accountability process and 
Civil society in EU governance —a 
remedy to the democratic account-
ability deficit? 
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as such it is an important actor in both theories of de-
mocracy. Civil society organisations (CSO) can pose 
questions and pass judgement, but it cannot be taken for 
granted that CSOs can impose consequences on the 
responsible actor “to turn matters right.” Furthermore, 
even if CSOs had the capacity to exert sanctions, it 
would constitute a case of accountability, but not neces-
sarily of democratic accountability.  
Moreover, the potential role of CSOs in EU account-
ability itself can be conceptualised in quite different ways. 
They can be instrumental as agents of public account-
ability, either as intermediaries of public accountability or 
as accountability actors in their own right; and they can 
contribute to make accountability a “virtue” that is alive 
and strong in EU governance.  
But before exploring the potential accountability func-
tions of CSOs we should clarify what qualifies as a “civil 
society organisation.” It is widely agreed that CSOs 
share some common features: They are voluntary asso-
ciations; independent, i. e. not bound by instructions from 
outside bodies; and they are not-for-profit. Furthermore, 
civil society organisations are expected to act in public 
and in a civil way. In this very broad understanding also 
associations representing trade, industry, and agriculture 
or professional interests qualify as CSOs since they are 
not profit oriented despite the profit orientation of their 
memberships. Thus in principle, they are not different 
from trade unions or many grass roots organisations, 
which also represent the interests of their memberships. 
The European Commission has propagated a rela-
tively wide understanding of CSOs, including 
“(…) trade unions and employers’ organisations 
(“social partners”); non-governmental organisations; pro-
fessional associations; charities; grass-roots organisa-
tions; organisations that involve citizens in local and mu-
nicipal life with a particular contribution from churches 
and religious communities. Civil society plays an impor-
tant role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and 
de l i ve r ing  serv ices  tha t  meet  peop le ’s 
needs” (Commission 2001: 14). 
When the Commission opened the online register 
CONECCS for “European-level civil society organisa-
tions” it introduced the category of “non-governmental 
organisation” (NGO). NGOs were defined more narrowly; 
in addition to the general criteria mentioned above, they 
were to serve the public good, be dedicated to the inter-
ests of a particular group of persons or of society as such 
(i. e. act in the interest of the “other”), and were not to act 
in favour of the economic or professional interests of 
their members. 
This categorisation of NGOs comes close to the self-
image of those organisations which have joined together 
in the Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG). They charac-
terise themselves as “rights and value based NGO”1, 
representing public interests. Their mission is to repre-
sent issues — whether environmental, social, develop-
mental or humanitarian — and to represent segments of 
society that do not have a voice — e.g. victims of human 
rights abuse, people experiencing extreme poverty, or 
minorities who are not in a position to speak for them-
selves (Platform of European Social NGOs 2001).  
CSO as agents of public accountability 
The Union has made much progress with respect to 
transparency by providing easy access to documents, 
giving information on the decision making process 
through the publication of legislative roadmaps, and 
opening comitology and expert groups. But transparency 
is just a necessary and not a sufficient prerequisite for 
public accountability. Democratic accountability needs 
publicity so that citizens may be alerted and able to judge 
whether or not the conduct of those in power matches 
their interests and aspirations. CSOs are seen as agents 
of accountability but the exact role attributed to them 
differs with the different concepts of democracy (Kohler-
Koch 2007; Kohler-Koch & Finke 2007). 
• Deliberative democracy in the tradition of Haber-
mas suggests that democratic decision making, 
ideally, rests on public deliberation aiming at rea-
soned consensus. Consequently, the role attributed 
to CSOs is to promote through active and contro-
versial debates in public the emergence of a Euro-
pean trans-national public sphere. The presentation 
of a wide diversity of views on the essence of envis-
aged policies and their likely consequences is sup-
posed to further the “enlightened understanding” of 
citizens and enable them to pass a rational and well 
reasoned judgement. Just because the diversity of 
views is so essential, all different kinds of CSOs are 
supposed to participate in this debate irrespective 
of whether they represent economic or social inter-
ests or pursue rights and value based political 
ends. CSOs’ contribution to democratic account-
ability thus depends on their capacity and willing-
ness to contribute to reasoned public deliberation. 
• From the perspective of liberal democracy CSOs 
serve democratic accountability by acting as watch-
dogs alerting their members or constituencies to 
any infringements on their preferences and by hold-
ing public agents on account in the name of those 
whom they represent. CSOs are thus instrumental 
in a pluralistic system where each CSO (or an ad-
vocacy coalition of CSOs) demands accountability 
in order to induce EU institutions to be responsive 
to the preferences of their membership. When as-
sessing the democratic value of CSOs’ engage-
ment, by contrast to the deliberative democracy 
approach, it is the nature of the association and the 
equal (or un-equal) endowment with resources that 
matters. Civil society associations acting in the pub-
lic interest get better marks than CSOs defending 
the focussed interests of their own membership. 
The yardstick for democratic accountability is the 
fair and equal representation of the plurality of inter-
ests.  
Do CSO in one way or the other (be it from the per-
spective of deliberative or liberal democracy) qualify as 
agents that further democratic accountability?  
———————————————————–—--———— 
1 See the CSCG homepage:  
http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/default.asp; 
27.02.2008  
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Here, empirical analysis is sobering.2  
• Looking at CSOs’ contribution from a deliberative 
democracy point of view, the findings are that the 
public sphere hardly benefits. Because CSOs are 
accountable to their members, they focus on issues 
of concern to their membership rather than promote 
general public debate. As such their agendas are 
narrow. So far the move to participatory govern-
ance has not prompted a public discourse involving 
both the Commission and civil society actors. The 
interaction between the Commission and CSOs is 
mostly a vertical relation, predominantly issue spe-
cific and, consequently, highly segmented. Initia-
tives have been launched in recent years to encour-
age horizontal communication between civil society 
organisations, and sector associations have estab-
lished networks and formed permanent platforms. 
Also the Commission has been eager to support 
dialogues for cross-cutting issues, not least to attain 
more policy coherence. Nevertheless, there is no 
European public sphere developing; even if there 
were civil society dialogue developing in Brussels, it 
does not register at the national civil society level. 
Hence, institutional constraints and membership 
concerns hamper CSOs’ potential contribution to a 
public deliberation that could promote democratic 
accountability (Dabrowska 2007). 
• From the perspective of liberal democracy CSOs 
are well equipped to be the watchdogs of good gov-
ernance. Their growing involvement in the policy-
making process gives them insight and access to 
decision-makers. However, representation is biased 
in favour of partial interests. CSOs representing 
producer interests are better organised, staffed and 
funded than those that defend public goods and act 
in the interest of those who have difficulties getting 
organised. The latter CSOs are mostly funded by 
the EU and this can make for a docile watchdog. 
The main impediment to efficient accountability is 
that EU institutions do not have to face direct con-
sequences when CSO hold them to account. CSOs 
have no legal right to ask any of the EU institutions 
to give account. They can only ring the fire-alarm 
and hope that this provokes pressure on the EP or 
the Council. With respect to the Commission, their 
intervention may alert the EP or the Court of Justice 
so that it will be exposed to horizontal accountabil-
ity. Apart from that, “blaming and shaming” is the 
only way to put pressure on the Commission. It is a 
soft instrument since the Commission is independ-
ent from public support (Persson 2007). 
CSO promoter of an EU accountability regime  
Before we end with a pessimistic appraisal of CSO 
contribution to EU accountability, we should remember 
Bovens’ reminder that accountability is not just a concept 
capturing the institutional arrangements in which an actor 
can be held to account by a forum, but it is also a norma-
tive concept. “Accountability or, more precisely, “being 
accountable” is seen as a virtue, as a positive quality of 
organisations or officials” (Bovens 2007b: 16). I propose 
that CSOs add significantly to the political accountability 
of the Union by strengthening the virtue of accountability. 
I argue that network governance has to rely on a sense 
of appropriate behaviour of public and non-public actors 
and that the institutionalisation of an “accountability re-
gime” establishes and supports a shared concept of ap-
propriateness. Drawing on IR regime theory, I call it an 
accountability “regime”. According to the consensus defi-
nition “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or ex-
plicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making pro-
cedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
(…)” (Krasner 1982:186). CSOs have engaged in nego-
tiations above all with the Commission to anchor the prin-
ciple of accountability in EU-civil society relations. In or-
der to make this virtue sustainable they pushed for 
agreements on norms, rules and procedures. With the 
publication of the White Paper on European Governance 
and the formalisation of EU consultations, accountability 
has become a major issue.  
According to the Commission the aim of governance 
reform was to “(…) help citizens to hold their political 
leaders and the Institutions to account for the decisions 
that the Union takes” (Commission 2001: 34). The result-
ing general norm is “Each of the EU institutions must 
explain and take responsibility for what it does in 
Europe” (Commission 2001: 11). In reverse, also CSOs 
are asked to be accountable: “With better involvement 
comes greater responsibility. Civil society must follow the 
principles of good governance, which include account-
ability and openness” (Commission 2001: 15). In the 
meantime accountability has developed from an abstract 
principle to a more precisely defined concept with explicit 
rules and procedures. Furthermore, negotiations be-
tween CSOs and individual General Directorates have 
upgraded the once one sided declaration of the Commis-
sion to an agreed commitment. Accountability is a 
“regime in the making” with some General Directorates 
taking the lead, forming an advocacy coalition with the 
members of the Civil Society Contact Group and aca-
demics dedicated to participatory engineering 
(Commission 2007). 
A balanced view on CSO contribution to EU account-
ability 
I agree with Papadopoulos that network forms of gov-
ernance and the multi-level allocation of jurisdictions in 
the EU entail a number of accountability problems. But I 
would argue that the mechanisms of accountability we 
are familiar with from national experience do not operate 
very factors that make it so difficult for the EP to hold EU 
decision-makers to account. Though CSO may be weak 
agents of public accountability they, nevertheless, have 
an influential role to play in bolstering the virtue of ac-
countability by helping to build an “accountability regime.” 
The next step for research would then be to assess the 
conditions that make such a regime effective  
———————————————————————–—- 
2 The findings are based on our on-going research 
project Democratic Legitimacy via Civil Society In-
volvement? http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/
fs_projekte_e.html and on the CONNEX Research 
Group on Civil Society and Interest Representation in 
EU-Governance, http://www.connex-network.org  
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and how it may strengthen the role of CSOs as agents of 
accountability, be it as intermediaries or as accountability 
actors in their own right. 
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Since the 1980s, European states have faced consid-
erable challenges increasing pressures on their social 
security systems due to downturns of the economy, 
growing unemployment, lower fertility grades and ageing 
(cf. Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Visser and Hemerijck, 
1997; Rhodes, 2001; Natali and Rhodes, 2004). In this 
respect, early retirement also constitutes a challenge. 
Indeed, in a system of pay-as-you-go, a great amount of 
pressure is exerted on the labour market when a great 
proportion of people retire early, especially in current 
ageing societies (e.g. Schludi, 2005; Natali and Rhodes, 
2004). All over Europe, these challenges have prompted 
governments to discourage early retirement, and to 
change existing early exit schemes in order to achieve 
higher levels of labour market participation, so as to sus-
tain national social security systems at large. The aim of 
this contribution is to outline how the concept of policy 
learning can be used to analyse such reforms of early 
retirement schemes. This is done by analysing the case 
of the Netherlands, for which this concept proves particu-
larly useful. 
Despite the fact that reforms of early retirement 
schemes have proven to be difficult to achieve (Natali 
and Rhodes, 2004), the Dutch case sharply contrasts 
this observation. Since its introduction at the end of the 
1970s as a way to fight youth unemployment (people 
retiring early being believed to free jobs for young peo-
ple), early retirement in the Netherlands was very wide-
spread and concerned a great amount of employees1. 
Despite this, reforms were conducted in a relatively fast 
pace with the involvement of the social partners. Agree-
ments in this domain, negotiated in the framework of 
social pacts, were implemented into actual policy by 
means of fiscal policy (from legally based fiscal incen-
tives to disincentives) at the national level, but most of all 
by means of collective labour agreements (CLAs) at the 
level of economic sectors. In 2004, the system was re-
formed through an overarching law VPL (VUT, Prepen-
sioen, Levensloopregeling – Early Retirement, Early Re-
tirement Pension, Life Course Savings Schemes) instead 
of previously minor changes on parts of this system. The 
social partners and the government agreed that, firstly, 
Using policy learning to analyse 
welfare state reform: the case of 
early retirement in the Netherlands 
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WIEKENKAMP 
new early retirement schemes would no longer be facili-
tated fiscally by tax deduction from 2006 onwards, and 
that, secondly, this would also apply to all existing 
schemes from 2009 onwards. It was agreed that the 
costs of early retirement would be paid out of individual’s 
net pay, so that these costs would be assumed by indi-
viduals choosing to retire early, and no longer by all pre-
mium contributors. This was supposed to make early 
retirement less attractive. This regulation also became 
part of the collective labour agreements of sectors with 
physically intensive labour in which employees generally 
retire earlier, since their physical conditions urged them 
to do so. 
The puzzle here is why social partners, and particu-
larly trade unions, supported and agreed on this turn-
over, because it is not in the interest of most older em-
ployees. Early retirement (VUT) was introduced as a way 
to fight youth unemployment, the idea being that older 
employees would be replaced by younger employees. 
The other goal of VUT was to promote the welfare of 
older employees. Because of the economic downturn, 
older employees were made redundant or received a 
disability benefit: early retirement was a better way to 
leave the labour market. The VUT was very popular 
amongst employers and employees. Employers used 
early retirement to dispose of older employees, whereas 
for employees, it was a socially acceptable way to leave 
the labour market. Retiring early is a condition of employ-
ment and is considered a vested interest. In order to ex-
plain this puzzle, the concept of policy learning can prove 
fairly useful, as will be outlined in the next section. 
 
——-——————————————————————— 
1 For instance, to give an impression of how institution-
alized the schemes are, in 2003 92 percent of the 
biggest collective labour agreements (CLAs), repre-
senting 4,9 million employees in a labour force of 7,0 
million employees (CBS, 2007), contain a clause on 
early retirement (SZW, 2003:49).  
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Operationalisation and preliminary research results 
The next step is how to distinguish learning. What 
were the reasons and motivations of the involved actors 
before the policy change, and how were they altered 
during the process towards this change? As Biegelbauer 
(2007) stresses, one must be able to differentiate be-
tween, for example, the outcome of negotiations and the 
process that led to this outcome. There was a policy 
change, but the question remains if this process towards 
the reform of early exit schemes can be best character-
ized as a learning process. In order to study this change, 
the method employed is historical process tracing 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 177). 
First of all, the rise of early exit schemes is studied by 
looking at how and why it came to existence, which ac-
tors were involved and what their positions were all along 
the process of institutionalisation. Then, after early retire-
ment became implemented as actual fiscal policy in 
1980, all policy documents (of e.g. parliament, Labour 
Foundation, Social and Economic Council, coalition 
agreements) and central level agreements that discuss 
the early exit schemes have been analysed. These docu-
ments and pacts state the position, both cognitive and 
normative, of the government and social partners about 
how to respond to the challenge of ageing, and which 
course to take to change these schemes accordingly. 
The agreements set out the intention of actors, but they 
do not indicate whether the intention has been put into 
action. In order to investigate if actors stick to their inten-
tions, more than twenty key representatives of the gov-
ernment and the social partners have been interviewed 
so far.   
To find out what the exact issues for debate were in 
this process towards reforming the system, one needs to 
know what the actual conditions and problems of applica-
tion were in order to outline the parameters of the debate 
in which learning may have taken place. This allows to 
find out what the parameters considered by the actors 
were, on what kind of issues there was a change of ori-
entations, and how this change of orientations came 
about. Yet, the government and the social partners agree 
on which course to take at the central level, but the out-
come takes place at the sectoral level by way of CLAs. 
Hence, negotiations and the implementation of outcomes 
take place at different levels. The social partners and the 
government agreed to change the schemes, but in a 
framework with different spheres of responsibility. Early 
retirement is part of tax legislation, part of general labour 
legislation, and it is also a condition of employment. 
Therefore, the agreements between government and 
social partners as well as the CLAs need to be studied.  
At the methodological level, the narrative is struc-
tured by clustering data in time periods. For each time 
cluster, a number of points are systematically analysed: 
1) which actors are involved and what is their position; 2) 
what are the issues in debate; 3) the output (the agree-
ments); and 4) the outcome in terms of meaning and 
impact. Regarding substantive policy positions and op-
tions, points of attention are the age of retirement, the 
kind of benefits, the level of benefits and the setting of 
contributions.  
Policy learning vs. power and interests 
According to the literature, one would expect actors 
with veto power, principally trade unions, to only think of 
their own vested interests and that change is therefore 
not possible. In relation to social pacts, this perspective 
considers that social partners are invited in policymaking 
to legitimise change and to neutralise their veto power, 
whereby powers and interests are battled out in a con-
frontational way. The other perspective, which seems to 
support the Dutch case, considers that social partners 
are invited in policymaking because they are needed to 
jointly solve problems and share their knowledge and 
experience so as to overcome problems of bounded ra-
tionality. In this reflexive setting, there is room to learn 
and to change preferences in order to come from one 
balance to another balance.  
Social and economic changes of the welfare state 
intersect with shifts in normative and cognitive orienta-
tions about what “good” policy should bring about. In 
searching for a theoretical explanation we need to delve 
deeper, beyond the idea that interests are fixed and sta-
ble and that institutional factors cannot be overcome. In 
particular, it is important to analyse how internal and ex-
ternal problems are interpreted by the relevant actors 
and search for a perspective that accounts for evolution-
ary change in a proactive and adaptive manner. This is 
the point of departure of policy learning2. The concept of 
policy learning questions how human beings actually 
reason and choose. It reckons for the reflexive and 
evaluative activities of the actor, and is therefore actor-
centred (Scharpf, 1997). 
With respect to welfare state reform concluded in the 
framework of social pacts, the learning perspective high-
lights how the policy orientations of actors within social 
pacts develop, how it affects the interactions within and 
between the actors, and how this, in return, affects policy 
outputs and outcomes. After all, actors interpret external 
pressures and internal challenges. Drawing upon Hall 
(1993), Bower (1975) and Biegelbauer (2007), learning is 
defined as the change of policy-relevant knowledge, 
skills or attitudes. It is the outcome of a voluntary revision 
of cognitive and normative orientations resulting from the 
transformation and recoding of information based on the 
observations and interpretation of experience and new 
information. Cognitive orientations are understood as 
causal propositions about what is effective and feasible 
in order to solve a problem. By contrast, normative orien-
tations refer to what is desirable and legitimate. In the 
domain under scrutiny, normative considerations concern 
the question of fairness and solidarity when changing 
early exit schemes. In this context, institutional struc-
tures and historical heritage are crucially important medi-
ating factors that structure and shape the learning proc-
ess, both as providing forums of discussion and in deter-
mining the policy parameters of the learning process 
(Hemerijck and Visser, 2003). 
—–———————————————————————-- 
2 For an extensive explanation of this argument, see 
Hemerijck et al., 2006.  
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However, the solutions regarding how to reform it 
remained an issue of debate. It needs to be stressed that 
all actors, jointly as well as individually, were looking for 
solutions to this problem. Finally, social partners, being 
mainly the trade unions since the employers agreed with 
the government, urged somehow by the government, 
agreed on a solution in which early retirement remains 
possible, but is funded to a greater extent on an individ-
ual basis. Hence, learning seems to have taken place 
under the impulsion of external parameters (growing 
costs and shadow of hierarchy) and the nature of the 
solutions found. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that the identification of learning is 
difficult and research intensive, a perspective focusing on 
learning is useful to assess how orientations of actors 
within social pacts develop, how it affects the interaction 
within and between the actors, and how this in return 
affects policy outputs and outcomes. This perspective 
allows to overcome puzzles that power resources- and 
interest-based approaches alone fail to explain. How-
ever, it is important not to exclude other possible expla-
nations that are part of this debate. Like Hemerijck and 
Visser (2003), Hemerijck et al. (2006) and Biegelbauer 
(2007) it is not my aim to advocate a learning perspective 
as an alternative to other explanations when investigat-
ing changing preferences. Yet, changing preferences are 
not sufficient, actors also need a power base to imple-
ment and change policy. The learning perspective should 
be used as a complement to mainstream path-
dependency, policy legacy and power resources ap-
proaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After structuring the data, it becomes clear that recur-
ring topics for debate are the way the system is financed 
and is maintained; the structure of financing and how it is 
taxed (employer-employee); how many people can use 
early retirement (coverage/participation ratio); the em-
bedment of early retirement in conditions of employment 
and CLAs; the level of the benefit; solvability and transi-
tional agreements. When relating these indicators to cog-
nitive orientations, one can think of factors that relate to 
the causal coherence between early retirement benefits 
and entitlements such as of factors that relate to the level 
of importance of these schemes as part of the social 
security system, what is the value of these schemes, the 
number of people it covers, what is the price one has to 
pay for it and how can it be changed. Whereas the cogni-
tive orientations focus on the practical and financial feasi-
bility of reforms, the normative orientations relate to the 
question of fairness and solidarity when changing the 
schemes. For instance to which group the schemes are 
aimed at, for which group are these schemes important, 
who are entitled, at what level should these schemes be 
offered, generic or sectoral. The normative orientations 
also concern the intergenerational dimension and de-
bate. 
These indicators are used to compare the positions 
of the actors in the different time clusters in order to as-
sess whether their orientations have changed over time, 
how they have changed and why they have changed. 
This last step is investigated by studying reports and 
minutes of workings groups in which representatives of 
government and social partners take part, and by the 
workings groups within each actor and finally by inter-
viewing representatives of each actor. Only then, one 
can determine how the knowledge and positions of a 
single actor has changed over time and if the process 
towards change can be best characterized as a learning 
process. 
Although it is not possible to provide complete re-
search results here, it is nevertheless possible to provide 
an example of the learning processes that have taken 
place in this particular case of policy change by using the 
theoretical framework and operationalisation presented 
above. Thus, whereas trade unions were initially op-
posed to changes in early retirement schemes that would 
endanger the right of retiring early or the level of the 
benefits, contrary to employers and government, the 
increasing costs3 of existing retirements schemes and 
the aspect of labour market participation as explicated in 
the introduction made them progressively change their 
preferences as to the opportunity of reforming these 
schemes.  
 
 
 
——-——————————————————————— 
3  For example the costs increased from 0,8 to 4,4 bil-
lion guilders between 1981 and 1987 (Bolhuis et al, 
1987). Further, in the beginning of the 1990s it was 
expected that the costs would increase by 100 per-
cent until the 2000s. 
Nynke Wiekenkamp has studied sociology at the 
University of Amsterdam. Her master’s thesis was 
entitled “Local learners? A study of knowledge and 
learning processes of Dutch local governments in 
combating poverty and social exclusion”. She is 
currently a PhD-student at the Amsterdam School 
for Social Science Research, (University of 
Amsterdam). Her research focuses on the 
development of early retirement schemes from a 
perspective focusing on learning.  
N.C.B.Wiekenkamp@uva.nl 
10 
Concepts & Methods Volume 4, Issue 1, Summer 2008 www.concepts-methods.org 
 
 
 
 
References 
Biegelbauer, P., “Wrestling with Methodology: Consid-
erations about Policy Learning”, IPSA Concepts & 
Methods Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2007  
Bolhuis, E.A., S.J. Ottens and M.A. Steenbeek-Vervoort, 
“De VUT met pensioen.” Economische statistische 
berichten, juni 1987 
Bower, G.H., “Cognitive psychology: an introduction”, in: 
Estes, W.K. (ed.), Handbook of learning and cogni-
tive processes. New York: Wiley, 1975 
CBS/Statistics Netherlands, Beroepsbevolking, StatLine, 
2007 
Ebbinghaus, B., A. Hassel, “Striking deals: concertation 
in the reform of continental European Welfare 
States”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, March 2000, pp 44-62 
George, A.L. and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005 
Hall, P.A., “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the 
State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Brit-
ain”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1993, pp 
275-296 
Hemerijck, A. and J. Visser, “Policy Learning in Euro-
pean Welfare States”, manuscript, University of Am-
sterdam, 2003 
Hemerijck, A., J. Visser, J. Zeitlin, G. Korthouwer, P. 
Sleegers, B. Vanhercke and N. Wiekenkamp, “How 
Europe’s semi-sovereign Welfare States Learn”, Po-
sition Paper for the mid-term evaluation of the Shifts 
in Governance programme at NWO-conference, No-
vember 13, 2006 
Natali, D., M. Rhodes, “The ‘New Politics’ of the Bis-
marckian Welfare State: Pension Reforms in Conti-
nental Europe”, European University Institute: Flor-
ence, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/10, 2004 
Rhodes, M., “The Political Economy of Social Pacts: 
Competitive Corporatism and European Welfare Re-
form”, in: Pierson, P. (ed.), The New Politics of Wel-
fare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp 165-
196 
Scharpf, F.W., Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder/
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997 
Schludi, M., The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Sys-
tems - A Comparison of Pension Politics in Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2005 
SZW/Ministry of Social Affairs and employment, 
“Voorjaarsrapportage CAO-afspraken 2004”, 
www.szw.nl, June 2004 
Visser, J., A. Hemerijck, ‘A Dutch Miracle’ – Job growth, 
welfare reform and corporatism in the Netherlands. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997 
11 
Concepts & Methods Volume 4, Issue 1, Summer 2008 www.concepts-methods.org 
tices…” (2007:4) the interpretation of the learning con-
cept offered, furthermore, falls short of providing insight 
in how power and knowledge intersect in understanding 
policy change. In addition, with the implicit focus on cog-
nition in policy design one of the most crucial questions 
for the policy sciences is bracketed altogether, namely 
the question how knowledge and action relate to one 
another. It is my contention – based on empirical work 
(e.g. Loeber, 2003) as well as on theoretical explorations 
(e.g. Loeber et al, 2007) – that it is in this respect that 
learning theories may contribute substantially to under-
standing complex political and societal dynamics (such 
as the possibility of fundamental institutional transforma-
tion e.g. in the face of ‘sustainability’ challenges). I am 
therefore happy to answer to the Newsletter’s kind invita-
tion to write on the concept of learning in reply to Biegel-
bauer’s work. Let me below first address briefly how to 
answer the seemingly simple question, phrased by 
Biegelbauer, of what policy learning actually is, that is, 
how to bring some order in the society of ideas. Any an-
swer to the question how to make the learning concept 
operational in actual empirical research, also put up for 
discussion by Biegelbauer, is highly contingent on how 
you cut the cake. 
Order in the ‘society of ideas’ 
 
Given the two-and-a-half decades of theory develop-
ment on the subject, obviously it is not possible to cover 
the full scope of the notion’s meanings that have been 
found contributory to the policy sciences. For an over-
view I refer the reader, with all due modesty, to the con-
tribution on learning written by John Grin and myself to 
the 2007 Taylor & Francis Group’s Handbook of Public 
Policy Analysis edited by Fischer, Miller and Sidney. 
There we take up the challenge of systematizing the vari-
ous learning approaches with the intention of assessing 
their merits for the conceptualization of 
‘governance’ (Grin and Loeber, 2007).  
The learning concept in the policy 
sciences: not too elusive to be 
meaningful in practice  
 
A comment on Biegelbauer 
 ANNE LOEBER 
 
From the 1980s onward, the notion of learning in 
political science has come to complement – and rival – 
power as an explanatory factor of policy change. Since 
Heclo’s (1974) observation that policy-making is a matter 
of ‘puzzling’ in addition to ‘powering’, a wide spectrum of 
theories on knowledge utilization and on the role of ideas 
and cognition has been developed. Biegelbauer’s expose 
on learning in the 2007 spring issue of this Newsletter1 
may be considered a brave attempt to bring order in this 
plethora of ideas on ideas. His account brought to mind 
Minsky’s famous dictum that “we use the single word 
‘learning’ to cover too diverse a society of ideas” (1987: 
120). Where Minsky wrestled with the learning concept in 
view of artificial intelligence, Biegelbauer’s intent was to 
pin down the notion in order to keep it from loosing its 
meaning for the policy sciences for sheer ubiquity: 
“everything can be understood as learning. One must be 
able to differentiate …; the term learning otherwise be-
comes meaningless” (2007:4). Indeed a comprehensive 
and systematic account of learning theories could be 
useful. It is therefore unfortunate that Biegelbauer pre-
sents a very limited take on the concept as if it were the 
only valid reading possible. He proposes to use the 
phrase policy learning for “the change of policy relevant 
knowledge, skills or attitudes, which are the result of the 
assessment of past, present or future policies” (2007:3). 
This is not so much an erroneous view as a blinkered 
one. Firstly, with the exclusive focus on policy design it 
fails to acknowledge the implications of the empirically 
informed dictum that policy implementation is the con-
tinuation of politics by other means (Majone and Wil-
davsky, 1984). By identifying learning as a distinct activ-
ity that one can engage in “alongside other daily prac-
———————————————————————-- 
1 Wrestling with Methodology: Considerations about 
Policy Learning. Concepts & Methods, vol. 3, Issue 
1; Spring 2007. 
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standing of learning in terms of an individual act of error 
correction or improved knowledge utilization by policy-
makers. Admittedly, the learning subject with Sabatier – 
analytically distinguishable subsets of actors who “share 
a particular belief system” (see below) which he dubs 
“advocacy coalitions” – are still groups of learning indi-
viduals, but the act of learning is per definition a social 
one which takes place in relation to and under the influ-
ence of others, both political actors and non-state actors. 
By shedding a light on how policy actors and non-
government actors can mutually engage in processes of 
learning, learning approaches provide an integral theory 
of the policy process that takes into account the role of 
ideas and arguments in addition to authority and other 
resources of power in explaining policy change. In addi-
tion, they provide a basis for understanding how political 
and societal dynamics in mutual constitution come to 
bear on policy design. The more sophisticated theories 
(e.g. Grin and Van de Graaf, 1996) furthermore take 
such an explanatory framework beyond the assumed 
caesura between policy design and implementation to 
understand how policy change and societal change in 
practice are mutually shaping and reinforcing. 
In order to fully grasp how learning theories may be 
useful in analyzing how political and social dynamics co-
evolve, we have to take into consideration whàt it is that 
is at stake in the act of learning. 
What is changing when learning takes place? 
The question as to what the object of learning is can 
be answered as variedly as can the question on the 
learning subject. Biegelbauer mentions “decisions (made 
in the past), as well as knowledge, skills and attitudes …
which might lead to decisions in the future” (2007:3). 
With such a focus, Biegelbauer’s interpretation of learn-
ing comes closest to the approach developed by Richard 
Rose (1993) whose work laid the foundations for the 
growing literature on learning across policy areas. Rose 
holds that policy-makers can draw lessons from the ex-
periences of their counterparts in other cities, regional or 
national governments in regard to comparable problems 
that will help them deal better with their own issues 
(Rose 1991: 4)3. Learning in this strand of theory building 
hence entails the process of developing an improved 
understanding of policy-related issues and as a conse-
quence an improvement in the quality of decision mak-
ing. 
Although increased knowledge is at issue too in the 
work of the aforementioned authors writing on learning 
within a policy domain, their take on the object of learn-
ing is entirely different. To Sabatier, what is at stake is 
what he dubs “policy beliefs”, that is a set of basic val-
ues, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions 
 
To that end, we distinguish between approaches that 
consider learning across policy domains – that is, with a 
focus on the transfer of insight and information produced 
within one policy area to another located elsewhere in 
space and/or time – and those that address and concep-
tualize learning within a policy area. In addition we dis-
cuss the upshot of theories on organizational learning for 
the policy sciences.  
Secondly we discuss the thus categorized theories by 
answering for each three questions: i) who are included 
as learning actors and how are these situated in relation 
to each other and to social and political institutions?; ii) 
what is considered to be actually changing when learning 
takes place?; and iii) to what kind of dynamics (policy 
change as well as e.g. institutional transformation) is 
learning supposed to contribute to?2 Here, I take these 
questions as a point of departure to systemically com-
ment on Biegelbauer’s take on the issue. These com-
ments in turn serve as a stepping stone to address the 
question which is of course ‘des Pudels Kern’: why would 
we, researchers of political dynamics, at all bother with a 
concept that, if not meaningless, is elusive to say the 
least? 
Who’s learning? 
A first issue to be addressed when scrutinizing a par-
ticular brand of learning theory is the question who is 
considered to be the learning subject. It is telling perhaps 
that Biegelbauer in the first two sections of his text no-
where mentions specifically who is doing the learning in 
his view. Only in the second part of the piece the learning 
subjects are identified as ‘political actors’; the later men-
tioned ‘members of parliament’ are a case in point. While 
the focus on the individually learning policy-maker is 
seemingly so self-evident that it needs no explication, the 
choice is surprising. 
In his exploration of what policy learning is, Biegel-
bauer refers to a variety of authors of which none would 
endorse this choice. Interesting about the work of the 
invoked Peter Hall (1993) and Paul Sabatier (1986; 
1987; 1999), who both write from a perspective on learn-
ing within policy domains, is that they include a wider set 
of learning subjects. To Hall, these include among others 
experts located at the “interface between the bureauc-
racy and the intellectual enclaves of society” (1993: 277). 
To Sabatier, the unit of analysis is what he calls the 
‘policy subsystem’, which comprises “those actors from a 
variety of public and private organizations who are ac-
tively concerned with a policy problem or issue” (Sabatier 
1987:652) among them e.g. journalists and other opinion 
leaders, scientists and grass-root activists in addition to 
government actors.  
Regardless of the differences in their approaches, 
both authors hence step away from the narrow under-
———————————–———-——————————- 
2 With these questions we build on Bennett & Howlett’s 
(1992) idea of bringing some order in the sea of sto-
ries on learning by submitting them to a set of de-
scriptive questions.. 
————————————————————————— 
3 In contrast to Biegelbauer, to Rose, the learning 
agents are civil servants and maybe their external 
advisers, but certainly not politicians. 
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Learning to what end? 
In Biegelbauer’s interpretation of the learning concept 
the purpose is quite straightforward: the learning political 
actor engages in reflection on policy-related decisions 
taken in the past (or elsewhere) in order to improve fu-
ture decision making. In the more inclusive reading of the 
notion as outlined above, the purpose of engaging in 
learning processes, if at all a conscious act of will, is to 
develop and continually adjust a strategy for shaping and 
implementing policies, and more generally, solving prob-
lems that is contingent on and optimized for the situation 
encountered. Since ‘the situation’ is inherently transient 
and dynamic, the learning actor is continually engaged in 
such processes of reflection. These may occasionally 
rescue him from the flux of time (“reflection-on-action” in 
Schön’s terminology) yet generally will involve a constant 
conversation with the world around that translates into 
action (“reflection-in-action”) on the spur of the moment.  
It is this conceived contingency between action, ideas 
and context that makes the learning concept useful and 
challenging for the researcher of policy-making practices. 
In the more traditional reading (say, Biegelbauer’s inter-
pretation of developing cognitive sophistication) learning 
is added as an explanatory factor to power resources 
and interests in explaining policy change. In the reading 
stipulated here, the focus on learning provides a way to 
perceive power and interest based actions (“powering” in 
Heclo’s words) in interplay with and mediated through 
processes of reflection and meaning-making(“puzzling”). 
That means, first of all, that the role and relative rele-
vance of power resources and the formulation of an ac-
tor’s specific interests in an issue at hand can, rather 
than as a priori given, themselves be made the object of 
research that need explanation. 
Secondly, it opens the door to exploring not only the 
causes of policy change but rather, more broadly, the 
relation between policy and the reproduction and trans-
formation of institutions or, put more conceptually, be-
tween agency and structure. This is an interesting road 
ahead as, after all, among the most fascinating chal-
lenges in both policy-making and the policy sciences 
alike is the question how to deal with so-called tenacious 
or ‘persistent’ problems. Such problems seem to defy 
any attempt at resolving through policy-induced solutions 
as their “wickedness” (Rittel and Webber, 1973) not only 
roots in their interlacing with other problematic situations 
but also, more importantly, in their embeddedness in 
institutions and routines which are considered perfectly 
legitimate and desirable. Let me clarify this statement 
with an example. The questionable tenability of health 
care systems in view of rising costs and increasing de-
mands provides a case in point: the rules and conven-
tions that are invoked in cost-reduction policy measures 
may themselves support features of the health care sys-
tem that lead (eventually) to cost increases. The problem 
here is not that a policy design as such is flawed or im-
plementation is wrongful, but rather that in designing and 
implementing cost-reducing policy measures, the in-
volved actors think and act through institutionally and 
culturally paved pathways, and thus underscore and ef-
fectuate in their actions the very features of the system 
(Sabatier 1987:660) that pertain to the issue at hand 
(“secondary aspects”) and underlying normative commit-
ments and values that hold for an entire policy domain 
(“deep-core beliefs”). Learning to him, then, is conceived 
of as lasting changes in the policy belief system.  
It is this understanding of the object of learning on 
which Grin and Van de Graaf (1996) build when they 
argue that non state actors (“policy target populations”) 
are equally involved in learning processes yet do not 
necessarily share a policy belief system. They may be 
characterized by belief systems (“theories of action”) 
which are rooted in the sort of practices they are profes-
sionally engaged in when contributing (or not contribut-
ing) to policy implementation: managing a firm, farming, 
developing technology and so on. In developing this ap-
proach, Grin and Van de Graaf link up Sabatier’s concept 
of belief system to the notion of ‘theories-in-use’ (or 
‘frame’) as elaborated by Schön (1983; Argyris and 
Schön 1974, 1996). 
Although at first sight perhaps an unlikely amalgama-
tion of ideas (in terms of research approach and basic 
ontological convictions Sabatier and an author such as 
Schön have very little in common), it is by probing in this 
direction that learning theories in my view gain sufficient 
explanatory power to help shed a light not only on the 
relation between knowledge and power but also between 
knowledge and action. The underlying idea here is that 
the object of learning is understood as a mental map of 
theoretical, normative and empirical considerations that 
professionals, be they state actors or non-state actors, 
invoke and put to use in their professional work. It is this 
‘metal map’ that is changing when learning takes place. 
The map is being reviewed in the process of learning as 
an integral aspect of daily practice (rather than “along 
side” of it as in Biegelbauer’s reading): observation and 
experience provide a continual flow of information 
through which an actor comes to reflect on his goals and 
actions, and on the way in which these relate to one an-
other in relation to the context in which he operates. Un-
derstood in these terms, the act of learning then may be 
defined as the process of inducing changes in the theo-
retical, normative and empirical considerations that an 
actor brings to bear on his or her problem solving activi-
ties and which come out in changes in the way he or she 
perceives and acts upon the world.  
This understanding of what learning entails prompts 
us to pose the question, on a meta-sociological level, 
what the relation is between the knowing and acting (and 
‘meaning-making’) individual and his or her context. Con-
siderations as to how to make the concept of learning 
operational strongly depend on how this question is an-
swered. Before bringing up the methodological implica-
tions, yet, let us first proceed to the third and arguably 
most relevant issue to be discussed: what is the purpose 
of learning? And with that, why should we, researchers, 
employ the concept in the first place? 
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‘stop-and-think’ is created: the often implicit, continual 
flow of ‘conversation with the situation’ in action is inter-
rupted to make place for a conscious and explicit reflec-
tion (and explication) of one’s motives for action, which 
results in a different take on what learning entails. A 
creative and interesting solution to this problem was in-
vented by Schön (1983) who sat professionals together 
in a teacher – student setting. Schön investigated the 
processes of learning that took place by analysing the 
transcripts of their conversations on the motives for ac-
tion that they engaged in. In my own empirical research 
on learning processes and the conditions under which 
learning takes place, I resolved the problem by combin-
ing interviewing with participant observation over longer 
periods of time. Analysis of the (speech) acts of the ac-
tors involved in a project (on corporate social responsibil-
ity in this case) indicated whether learning took place; 
inferences to such end I checked and put up for discus-
sion in interviews with those involved when the project 
was finished (Loeber, 2003). 
There is yet another, more fundamental problem. 
When learning is looked upon as a social rather than an 
individual act, the question is what the unit of analysis 
should be. The shift in focus (from the learning individual 
to the learning collective) can be accompanied by a shift 
in locus: rather than focusing on the ‘meanings’ (as in the 
theories-in-use of a professional, or in the belief system 
of an advocacy coalition) located in the mind of the learn-
ing actor, the researcher may wish to focus on the rela-
tion between the meaning-making individual and his or 
her context. This issue is at the heart of a heated debate 
between those who situate the metal map as an a priori 
given within the acting and learning individual (as does 
e.g. Sabatier) and those who hold that perceptions of a 
concrete situation are in situ produced in a reciproque 
relationship between contextual phenomena and the 
individuals’ attempts at constructing meaning in regard to 
those phenomena, mediated through linguistic systems 
(‘vocabularies’‚ ‘repertoires’, ‘narratives’; e.g. Hajer, 
1995). 
Yet as researchers I don’t think we have to take the 
suggestion of a dreary dichotomy between an individual-
ist ontology versus a collectivist ontology for granted. In 
line with the structuralist (Giddensian) position outlined 
above, it is my contention that with a sophisticated mix of 
methods (e.g. interviewing in combination with forms of 
discourse analysis) one is able to capture the dualist 
character of the meaning making individual and the 
‘collectivity’ of sets of rules and resources (structure, 
‘regime’, including language) that influence actors and on 
which they draw as they produce and reproduce mean-
ing (and, with their actions, society). Thus defined and 
operationalised, the learning concept may add to our 
understanding of the relation between ideas and power 
in policy change, as well as of the interaction between 
government and society in policy design and implemen-
tation. Yet it is specifically for its explanatory power in 
analysing the relation between knowledge and action 
that the notion of learning may prove of practical valuable 
for the researcher of political and social dynamics. 
 
they seek to change (cf. Schuitmaker, forthcoming; cf. 
Grin & Van Staveren, 2007). 
This (and comparable empirical) insight builds on 
Giddens theorem of the ‘duality of structure’: Actions of 
actors (“agents”) are informed by their own motivations 
and intentions (and interpretations of the intentions of 
others) as well as moderated and guided by structure, 
that is, by concepts of rules, resources and other expres-
sions of social institutions. According to Giddens(1984), 
such structure presents a “virtual order” that exists be-
yond time and place, and that comes into being only by 
an “actualisation” or “instantiation” through the actions of 
actors. In other words, action (human conduct) and struc-
ture (social institutions) presuppose one another, and it is 
through action that structures are reproduced. Funda-
mental institutional reform then implies the need for 
changing reiterative patterns of conduct (to Giddens, 
institutions are “those practices that have the greatest 
time-space extension”) which, in turn, requires a revision 
of the ‘mental maps’ that actors bring to bear on their 
problem solving activities. In other words, it requires 
learning! 
For the policy-maker, this interpretation of the learn-
ing concept may have instrumental value in policy design 
that seeks to contribute to fundamental institutional 
change (see e.g. Loeber et al., 2007). For the re-
searcher, learning – understood as a process of reflec-
tion on and reviewing of an actor’s theoretical, normative 
and empirical considerations regarding e.g. existing rou-
tines, rules and values in practice – offers a practical 
concept to make the rather abstract notion of 
‘structuration’ operational. But how then would one make 
the learning concept itself operational in research? 
By way of conclusion: some methodological reflec-
tions  
As observed, any statement about how make to the 
learning concept operational presupposes some notion 
of what it is and of how the various units of analysis in-
volved are defined. However, the described shift in focus 
that is observed in policy-oriented learning theories, from 
governmental actors to including societal actors, did not 
as such have methodological implications. Like the gov-
ernment-focused theories (e.g. Rose, 1991), the early 
theories that had a more inclusive take on learning (e.g. 
Sabatier, 1986) adopted a neo-positivist, hypothesis test-
ing approach to analysing learning and policy change. 
Sabatier and colleagues, for instance, used extensive 
surveys (questionnaires) to map changes in policy beliefs 
over time. Yet the methodological aspects of learning 
theories have become a topic of discussion. Interpretivist 
(phenomenological, constructivist) perspectives on learn-
ing are winning ground. The basic constructivist assump-
tion that while reality may be ‘out there’, it can only be 
known ‘through the eye of the beholder’ has implications 
for the practice of doing research on learning. Learning 
may be said to be observed when in interviews actors 
themselves report a revision of their mental maps. A ma-
jor problem with using interviews as a basis for investi-
gating learning, however, is that as soon as one sits 
down to interview someone on the topic, a situation of 
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cept formation as well as operationalization and measu-
rement.  
While the first two IPSA C&M and CIDE awards sought 
to recognize innovative work in the more narrow field of 
„democratic studies,“ the award is now targeting concep-
tual innovation in the broader field of comparative poli-
tics. 
 
SUBMISSIONS 
Submissions are open to authors, journal editors, and 
book publishers. Jury members, too, may suggest candi-
dates.  
We encourage self-nominations. When submitting the 
work of others, please make sure you have obtained the 
express consent of the author.  
Board members of the Committee on Concepts and Me-
thods are banned from participation.  
Submissions must include:  
• four copies of the work you submit, 
• mailing address, phone, fax, and e-mail of the 
author, and 
• mailing address, phone, fax, and e-mail of the per-
son who submits (if different from author). 
 
Please, submit nominations by mail to: 
 
Andreas Schedler 
C&M Vice-Chair 
CIDE  
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
Department of Political Studies 
Carretera México Toluca 3655 
Col. Lomas de Santa Fé 
Del. Alvaro Obregón 
CP 01210 Mexico City 
Mexico 
 
All submissions must reach us before 31 December 
2008. 
 
JURY 
For each award, the Committee on Concepts and Me-
thods nominates a jury composed of three distinguished 
scholars in field of comparative politics.  
The 2009 jury will be formed by James L. Gibson 
(Washington University in St. Louis), winner of the previ-
ous award and chairperson of the jury, John Gerring 
(Boston University), and Mark Bevir (University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley). 
The jury will seek consensual decisions. In case of di-
sagreement, it will rule by majority. Jury decisions are 
final.  
PRICE MONEY 
The winner of the price will be awarded 1.500 USD (one 
thousand five hundred US Dollars). At the jury’s discreti-
on, the price is divisible between various winners.  
A L L  F O R  
S U B M I S S I O N S  
 
2009 Award for Conceptional 
Innovation in Comparative 
Politics 
C 
IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), 
Mexico  
The Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M) of the 
International Political Science Association and the Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexi-
co City invite submissions to the third tri-annual Award 
for Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Politics.  
 
The award is given every three years at the World Cong-
ress of the International Political Science Association
(IPSA) 
 
2003 Award 
The first was awarded in 2003 to Gerardo L. Munck 
(University of Southern California) and Jay Verkuilen 
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) for their ar-
ticle „Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evalu-
ating Alternative Indices,“ published in Comparative Poli-
tical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 5-34.  
 
2006 Award 
The 2006 Award for Conceptual Innovation in Democra-
tic Studies was granted to James L Gibson, Sidney W. 
Souers Professor of Government at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis, for his book Overcoming Apartheid. Can 
Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2004). 
The third award will be given at the 2009 IPSA World 
Congress in Santiago de Chile.  
 
CRITERIA 
The III CIDE-C&M award will be given to a scholarly work 
published any time between 1 January 2006 and 31 De-
cember 2008.  
Any category of formal publication may be submitted, 
whether it is a book, book chapter, or journal article.  
 
The idea of „conceptual innovation“ is to be understood 
broadly. It is intended to cover concept analysis and con-
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S u p p o r t e d  b y 
C & M  w o r k i n g  p a p e r s  
The C&M working paper series are published by the 
COMMITTEE ON CONCEPTS AND METHODS (C&M), the 
Research Committee No. 1 of the INTERNATIONAL PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (IPSA), hosted at CIDE in 
Mexico City. C&M working papers are meant to share 
work in progress in a timely way before formal publica-
tion. The Committee publishes two series of working 
papers:  
Political Concepts contains work of excellence on 
political concepts and political language. It seeks to 
include innovative contributions to concept analysis, 
language usage, concept operationalization, and 
measurement.  
Political Methodology contains work of excellence on 
methods and methodology in the study of politics. It 
invites innovative work on fundamental questions of 
research design, the construction and evaluation of 
empirical evidence, theory building and theory testing. 
The series welcomes, and hopes to foster, contribu-
tions that cut across conventional methodological di-
vides, as between quantitative and qualitative methods, 
or between interpretative and observational ap-
proaches.  
SUBMISSIONS 
All papers are subject to review by either a member of 
the Editorial Board or an external reviewer. Only Eng-
lish-language papers can be admitted. Authors inter-
ested in including their work in the C&M Working Paper 
Series may seek initial endorsement by one editorial 
board member: w w w . c o n c e p t s - m e t h o d s . o r g. 
Alternatively, they may send their paper by e-mail to: 
workingpapers@concepts-methods.org. 
Authors bear full responsibility for the content of their 
contribution. All rights reserved. 
ACCESS 
The C&M webpage offers full access to past working 
papers as well as to commentaries by readers: 
www.concepts-methods.org 
The IPSA Committee on 
Concepts and Methods (C & M) 
The IPSA COMMITTEE ON CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
(C&M) promotes conceptual and methodological discus-
sion in political science. It provides a forum of debate 
between methodological schools who otherwise tend to 
conduct their deliberations on separate tables. It grants 
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mocratic Studies,” publishes two series of working pa-
pers, “Political Concepts” and “Political Methods,” and 
coordinates “Les Intraduisibles: The Dictionary of Un-
translatable Terms in Politics”. 
Chairperson: Andreas Schedler (CIDE, Mexico City), 
www.concepts-methods.org 
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